

~~TOP SECRET RUEY TRIN~~

25 April 1968

NSA, DIA & ONI Declassification/Release Instructions on File.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence *CH*

SUBJECT : Comments on Admiral Rickover's
Testimony Before Stennis Prepared-
ness Subcommittee

25X1A9a

1. Admiral Rickover appeared before the Preparedness Subcommittee on 13 March to testify on the US nuclear submarine and surface ship programs. The Admiral spoke after Captain Bradley of the Naval Intelligence Command presented an intelligence briefing on the Soviet submarine threat. Yesterday [REDACTED] and I read the transcript of the meeting.

2. Captain Bradley's briefing was drawn almost entirely from agreed national intelligence, and we would have no comment to offer the Senate staff on this part of the session. Admiral Rickover interrupted the briefing once to comment on the new evidence that the Soviet nuclear-powered N-class attack submarine could attain speeds of 26 knots. Recalling that this submarine was previously estimated to have a maximum speed of 22 knots, the Admiral criticized what he described as the conservative approach of the intelligence community. He was particularly upset that the Department of Defense had not yet changed the 22-knot figure in its Table of Effectiveness used to calculate US needs.

*July
made it about
1963. J*

3. The particular focus of the Admiral's concern was the disparity between the Soviet attack submarine fleet (about 275, including 17 nuclear) and that of the US (105, including 33 nuclear). Admiral Rickover said he believed the US was falling farther and farther behind the USSR in attack submarines. He said the US should be building a 31-knot attack submarine and should be planning for a 34-knot submarine.

* We believe it can probably go
maybe 2 knots faster, but
have no evidence to prove it.

TCS 880/68
Copy No. 1

~~TOP SECRET RUEY TRIN~~

~~TOP SECRET RUE TT~~

4. The Admiral saved his most scalding attack for the Department of Defense, particularly the cost effective "types" in Dr. Enthoven's shops whose only contribution was delay. He criticized the entire process used by the DOD to develop new submarines and surface ships. The Admiral sees in the Soviet approach a decision to build single-mission submarines which can be turned out cheaper and faster than submarines built for multiple missions according to DOD requirements.

*probably
a correct
view. J*

BRUCE C. CLARKE, Jr.
Director
Strategic Research

25X1A

TCS 880/68

-2-

~~TOP SECRET RUE TT~~

~~TOP SECRET~~CONTROL NO. TCS 880/68
Copy No. 1DDI-1265 -68

REFERRED TO OFFICE	RECEIVED		RELEASED		SEEN BY	
	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	DATE	TIME	NAME & OFFICE SYMBOL
Deputy Director for Intelligence				<u>115</u>	<u>0900</u>	
DCI						
DDI						
D/OSR						

Please see DCI's comments.

Handle Via Indicated Controls

TALENT -KEYHOLE-COMINT

.....

.....

.....

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws U. S. Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794 and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels. Its security must be maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining to the TALENT-KEYHOLE and Communications Intelligence Controls. No action is to be taken on any communications intelligence which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantage to be gained, if such action might have the effect of revealing the existence and nature of the source, unless such action is first approved by the appropriate authority.

~~TOP SECRET~~